DEVELOPMENTS IN JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT
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"No sovereignty can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits to subject either persons or property to its judicial decisions. Every exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding
such a person or property in any other tribunal."'
The above quotation not only expresses the orthodox view of
American jurisprudence relating to the Conflict of Laws but also
reflects the traditional view with reference to the requirements of
due process imposed by the constitution or the courts of the overreaching state. 2 Nevertheless, on various theories, judgments
against a foreign corporation doing business locally, with or without
formal admission to do local business, were recognized as valid
under statutes providing for service on the local agent of such
corporation. With regard to such corporation, one theory is that
the foreign corporation, which could be excluded by a state from
doing local intrastate business, by coming into the state to do such
business "impliedly consented" to such jurisdiction, at least as to
causes of action arising out of the conduct of the local business.,
Another theory is the "presence" theory, based on the reasoning
that a corporation is present wherever it is doing business ;4 a theory
made possible by the "incorporeal" nature of such a juristic person.
The voluntary act of a foreign corporation seeking authority to do
local business and, as one step in obtaining such authority, expressly
consenting to the appointment of an agent to receive process, perhaps hardly deserves to be classified as an additional theory, even
though jurisdiction so obtained can extend to out-of-state causes of
action. 5 These rationalizations were specifically restricted to the
*
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corporate business unit in Flexner v. Farson, or, by later decision,
at least to businesses quasi-corporate in form. 7 Since the state did
not have the power to exclude the nonresident individual, reasoned
the court in the Flexner case, the analogy to the implied consent
theory failed; accordingly, service on the local agent of the nonresident partners was not binding on the partner who had not been
personally served. Appearance or personal service was said to be
required by the due process clause. 8 Subsequent decisions in several
state courts follow the general doctrine of that case ;9 nevertheless,
an occasional state court strains to justify the actual decision in the
Flexner case on the rather dubious idea that the person who was
served was not the agent of the defendants at the time of service. 10
The first inroads upon the doctrine of lexner v. Parson came
in those cases which, however the court may have rationalized the
result, can be categorized as cases where the state had a "high social
interest" in the protection of its citizens from the dangers to which
they were confronted by the nonresident individual's activities
within the state. The three main activities of this class were: (1)
driving an automobile on the state's highways; (2) selling securities
within the state; (3) conducting operations within the state which
were "fraught with danger." State statutes providing for substituted service (i.e., on some state official, usually the Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles) on the nonresident motorists were accordingly
upheld on the basis of the police power of the state to regulate
public safety on the highways," bolstered by the argument, familiar
in the case of the foreign corporation, that the state could exclude
the noncitizen from using the highways.1 2 In regard to the sale of
securities the Supreme Court in Henry Doherty & Co. v. Goodman1
0 248 U. S. 289 (1918).
78 See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537 (1928).
U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
Andrews Bros. v. McClanahan, 220 Ky. 504, 295 S. W. 457 (1927) ; Woodfin v. Curry, 228 Ala. 436, 153 So. 620 (1934) ; Martin v. Slagle, 178 Tenn. 121,
156 S. W. 2d 403 (1941).
'o Stoner v. Higginson, 316 Pa. 481, 175 Atl. 527 (1934); Miller v. Swann,
176 Mise. 607, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 247 (1941).
I' Indeed, this doctrine even antedated the Flexner case. Kane v. New
Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 352 (1927):
"[I]n the public interest the state may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and nonresidents
alike. "1
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160 (1916).
'1 294 U. S. 623 (1935).
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reasoned that since the state had treated such activity as "exceptional" and subject to special regulation, as shown by enactment
of a Blue Sky law, the service on the agent of the nonresident was
valid, even though made under a general statute relating to "doing
business" on the part of nonresidents. The third exception, which
can encompass more varied activities, is justified on the ground that
the conduct of a "hazardous" business is subject to the "police
power" of the state to enact laws for the reasonable protection of
its citizens. Accordingly, it was held that the building of a levee
was "fraught with danger" and as such the state had the power
to provide for substituted service in a local suit against the non4
resident contractor.'
Prior to the International Shoe case, 15 which affords a new
means to uphold substituted service in local suits against nonresidents engaged in business within the state, there were only two
jurisdictions willing to break away from the Flexner decision and
say that simply to be conducting "business" (to be contrasted with
the specific activities seen above), would be sufficient to make the
nonresident amenable to suit by service on his agent. In finding a
New York statute's constitutional, the New York court viewed as
sufficient the test "whether the cause of action arises out of the
conduct of business by the nonresident,' "17 and service on the managing agent of the nonresident owners of income-producing buildings was held binding on them in a suit by a plaintiff injured by a
fire in the building. The same New York statute was upheld in a
later case,18 although it was found that the service was invalid,
because made in a suit upon a cause of action not arising out of the
conduct of local business. Pointing both to the reasonableness of
the statute, and for good measure, to the police power concept as
embracing "regulations designated to promote public convenience
or the prosperity or welfare," the Supreme Court of Pennsyl1 Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 P. 2d 740 (5th Cir. 1944).
15 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
16 . Y. CIVIL PRACucE AcT, § 229 (b).
17.-Miller v. Swam, 176 Mfisc. 607, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 247 (1941) ; contra: Smith
v. Cook, 43 Pa. D. & C. 608 (1941), as to the collection of rents as amounting
to doing business. See also, Dubin v. Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938),
87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 119 (1938).
IsInterchemical Corp. v. Mirabelli, 269 App. Div. 224, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 522
(1945). This and the prior New York cases relied on an exhaustive treatment
of the entire problem in: Report of the N. Y. Law Rev. Com. Leg. Doc. No. 65

(1940).
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vania' 9 upheld substituted service under a Pennsylvania statute
permitting local suits against a nonresident "who engages in business" in that state. The utilization of this idea has been supported
on the basis that, since the nonresident accepts the benefit of the
protection of the laws of the state through his agent, he should be
amenable to the jurisdiction of the forum, at least within a restricted range of actions.21
Although most of the jurisdictions had not so flatly disregarded
the reasoning of Flexner v. Parson,it is interesting to note that a
number of state legislatures either enacted statutes providing for
substituted service of process on the nonresident individuals subsequently to that decision or simply left prior similar statutes unrepealed. The status of the rule that jurisdiction over individuals
rests on physical power must have been uncertain at best in the
minds of the legislators of these fourteen states.22
In 1945, Mr. Justice Stone speaking for the court in the International Shoe case critically re-examined the fictional approaches
upon which the validity for the substituted service statutes rested
and formulated a new approach:

"Now that capias ad respondenum has given .way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment personam, if he be not present within the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' ",23
Given, then, a sufficiency of "minimum contacts" by the nonresident with the state, this "substantial justice" theory considers
it "fair play" to render the nonresident amenable to local suit

2
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20 PuDoN 's PA. STAT. ANN. 1953, Tit. 12, § 297.
1
Daum, Transaction of Business Within the State by a Non-Resident as a
Foundation for Jurisdiction,19 IowA L. REv. 421 (1934); Culp, Process in
Actions Against Non-Residents Doing Business Within a State, 32 MiN. L.
Ruv. 909 (1934).
22
ALA. CODE 1951 Tit. 7, § 199 (1); DEIL. REv. CoDE 1935, § 4579; BuRNs'
IND. ANm'. STAT. 1933, § 2-703; IowA CoDE ANN. 1951, § 56 (g); CAoL's
Ky. CODES 1944, § 51.6; ME. R v. STAT. 1944, c. 99 § 21; MIss. CODE 1942,
§ 1437; X. Y. CrvIi PRACTECE ACT, § 229 (b); N. C. GEN. STAT. 1943, § 1-97;
S. 0. CODE 1942, § 7797; PuRuoN's PA. STAT. AN. 1953, Tit. 12 § 297; WELIaAmS' TENNm.
CoDE 1934, § 8669; VERNON'S Tsx. Civ. STAT. 1950, § 2033 (b);
VT. STATS. RLEV.1947, § 1556.

23 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945).
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through substituted service in causes of action arising out of these
minimum contacts, without forcing the local aggrieved resident to
24
go to the expense of suing in the defendant's state.
Although Mr. Justice Stone's above quoted remarks were made
in a case involving a foreign corporation it would seem that the
rationale of the International Shoe case is also applicable to the
nonresident individual or unincorporated business unit.
It seems quite clear, therefore, that the Flexner decision has
been in principle overruled. 25 That logical consequence of the
International Shoe case was expressly recognized in an Arkansas
case2 6 and in a recent Tennessee case 27 upholding substituted service on an out-of-state unincorporated association. And, although
the International Shoe case was not mentioned, two subsequent
Utah cases28 reflect the "substantial justice" approach of that case
by reasoning that it is not an unfair imposition upon the nonresident to make him defend in the state where he commits the alleged
wrong. A few additional recent cases pay lip service to some of
the traditional evasive techniques by resort to the concept of the
hazardous undertaking and of regulated business. 29 In a lone later
case,80 one court has failed to read the handwriting on the wall left
by the InternationalShoe case and, by dictum at least, purports to
follow the doctrine of Flexner v. Parson, although the case can be
explained as one where the nonresident did not come within the
"doing business" terminology of the local statute, under the traditional. interpretation of "doing business." 8 '
24 Application of the rationale to foreign corporations was recently made in
Krnaeh v. Electro-life, 13 l. R. D. 131 (N. D. Ohio 1952); Klein v. Sunbeam
Corp., - Del. -, 94 A. 2d 385 (1952).
2 Overton, Broadening the Basis of IndividuaZ In Personam Jurisdictionin
Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. REv. 237 (1952) at p. 244. See also, RESTATEMENT,
CONPLICT op LAWS, § 84; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, § 22.
28 Gillioz v. Kineannon, 213 Ark. 1010, 214 S. W. 2d 212 (1948).
2
7 McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union of America, - Tenn. -, 254 S. W.

2d 1 (1952).
28 Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P. 2d 222, 228 (1948) : "to require
a resident who is transacting business in this locality to commence his action
in a foreign jurisdiction on a cause of action arising here and transplant his
witnesses to other estates would make protection of his right prohibitive."
Alward v. Green, - Utah -, 245 P. 2d 855 (1952).
2 Condon v. Snipes, 205 Miss. 306, 326, 38 S. 2d 752, 756 (1949), 'we are
not called upon to pass the validity where the defendent is not subject to state
regulation."
Davis v. Nugent, 90 F. Supp. 52 (D. C. Mfiss. 1950).
3' Travis v. Fuqua, 121 Ind. App. 440, 97 N. E. 2d 867 (1951).
"-N ot only was the activity mere solicitation, but it was solicitation by a
carrier for transportation which was to take place outside of the jurisdiction
where the ticket was sold.

JURISDICTION ovEa NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS

83

Besides the foregoing judicial developments since the International Shoe case, six states 32 have enacted statutes providing for
local suit by substituted service against the nonresident unincorporated business unit, two of them relating only to unincorporated
3
associations. 3
Under the "minimum contacts" test for satisfying a due process
requirement,3 4 the InternationalShoe case offers a basis for further
jurisdictional expansion of the state courts beyond the traditional
concept of "doing business." For example, solicitation, even repeated solicitation, of local orders for acceptance out of state, for
goods to be shipped from out of state, was traditionallynot held to
amount to doing business. 35 But it does not follow that such repeated solicitation does not subject the out-of-state enterprise to
local suit if the local statute is so drafted as to take advantage of
the Constitutional largesse of the InternationalShwe case. Several
cases involving foreign corporations decided since the International
Shoe, case are illustrative. In one case the single isolated act of
repairing a roof within the jurisdiction was held sufficient contact
with the state to make the nonresident corporation amenable to
local service of process in action for a tort connected with the
act.3 6 In another case the use of an airport by the nonresident
corporation's airplane was held to constitute enough contact under
the minimum contacts test to validate substituted service of process
on the corporation.3 7 A frank statutory expansion of local jurisdiction was upheld in a recent Federal decision 3s under a local
"-ARK. STAT. 1947, §27-340: "by the doing or the performing of such
work." NIote, 3 Anx. L. R~. 22 (1947): "the Arkansas general assembly may
have been motivated by that decision [InternationalShoe case] in the enactment
.FLA.
STAT. ANN. 1951, § 4716: "any transaction or transactions
of the act."
or operation with or incidental to business or business venture." Mass. ANN.
LAws 1949, c. 227, § 5 (A) : "doing business within the state." UTAH CODE
ANN. 1947, §78-27-20: "doing business in this state."
33 CoNN. GEN. STAT. 1947, c. 384, § 7776: "doing business, acting or carrying out its operations." WnIAMS' TENN. CODE §8681.1, 1952 Supp.
34 The other requirements in regard to service of process are notice and the
opportunity to defend. Simon v. Graft, 182 U. S. 427 (1901).
"a Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530 (1907).
"1 Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 577, 80 A. 2d
664, 669 (1951), referring to cases contra to the holding in the case the court
said, "They all precede in time the International Shoe decision, which marked
VT. ACTs 1947, § 1562 was the statute
a change in the judicial climate."
upheld.
7 Peters v. Robin Airlines, - Misc. -, 118 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (1952).
"1 Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. C. Md.
1950).
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statute expressly permitting local suit by substituted service "on
any cause of action arising out of a contract made within this state
of liability incurred for acts done within this state, whether or
not such foreign corporationis doing or has done business in this
state." 39 [Italics added.] While the court admitted that the acts
of solicitation of the defendant would not amount to "doing business," they were sufficient to make him amenable to local suit under
the statute. The same doctrines would seem equally applicable,
under appropriate statute, to nonresident individuals having such
minimum contacts.
Courts have not as yet substantially expanded the "doing business" basis of jurisdiction, being restricted by the wording of the
state statute and the gloss which the term has acquired.40 However,
it was the broad interpretation of the local statute phrased in terms
of "doing business" that led to the Supreme Court decision in the
International Shoe case. The lone solicitation case 41 involving a
nonresident individual to arise subsequent to the decision in the
InternationalShoe case suggests that the nonresident was not engaged in business within the state by merely soliciting contracts of
entertainment at schools; although another explanation is that the
person served was not sufficiently an "agent."
It remains for the legislatures of the states to take advantage
of their expanded constitutional power to determine what acts will
subject the defendant to local suit. A statute has been suggested
eliminating the ambiguous term, "doing business," and which
would permit local suit: "For any and all actions, suits, demands,
9 rAcx1's M . ANN. STAT. 1947, a. 23 § 119 (d).

Charles Keeshin, Inc. v. Gordon Johnson Co., 109 F. Supp. 939 (W. D.
Ark. 1952); Melvin Pine & Co. v. McConnell, 273 App. Div. 218, 76 NJ Y. S.
2d 279 (1948), aff'd 298 N. Y. 27, 30, 80 N. E. 2d 137, 137 (1948): "It is
unnecessary at this time to say, whether and to what extent that test may be
relaxed in reliance upon the constitutional principles recently announced by
the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington." For case prior
to the International Shoe case holding that solicitation per se is not doing
business within the forum see: O'Hagan v. Caballero, 52 N. Y. S. 2d 863,
aff'd unthout opinion 269 App. Div. 981, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 300 (1945); Debrey
v. Hanna, 182 Mise. 824, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 551 (1943) ; Johnson Freight Lines v.
Davis, 170 Tenn. 177, 93 S. W. 2d 637 (1936); Kaffenberger v. Kremer 63 F.
Supp. 924 (E. D. Pa. 1945); Deutsch v. Hoge, 146 F. 2d 201, 203 (2d Cir.
40

1944): L. Hand in dissent,

"...

when an individual sends agents into the

state . . . continuously to solicitate orders, he subjects himself to service by
notice alone.. ." Cf. Storey v. United Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 896 (E. D. S. 0.
1946).
,Alward

v. Green, -

Utah -,

245 P. 2d 855 (1952).
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or claims in law or equity, either at common law, or under appropriate statute arising out of the commission of the tort, or making
or breach of the contracted obligation.' '42
In conclusion, the International Shoe case affords a basis for
the expansion of local suits against the nonresident individuals in
three directions:
(1) It impliedly overrules Flexner v. Parson.
(2) It offers a basis for upholding a state statute defining the
acts of the nonresident not as the traditional "doing
business," but more broadly, as categories amounting to
"minimum contacts" -with the local state.
(3) It may lead the court, without help from the legislature,
to modify their doing business requirement so as to include those acts amounting to "minimum contacts" with
the forum.
112Overton, Broadening In, Personam Jurisdiction in Tennessee, 22 TaNx. L.
REV. 238 (1952), at p. 248. The statute was only to apply to the individual
nonresident.

